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IMPERFECT MONITORING AND IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS
BY MARTIN W. CRIPPS,G EORGE J. MAILATH, AND LARRY SAMUELSON1
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public
monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy
that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a
player cannot indeﬁnitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence
of imperfect monitoring.
KEYWORDS: Reputation, imperfect monitoring, repeated games, commitment,
Stackelberg types.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE ADVERSE SELECTION APPROACH to reputations is central to the study of
long-run relationships. In the ﬁnitely-repeated prisoners’ dilemma or chain-
store game, for example, the intuitive expectation that cooperation or entry
deterrence occurs in early rounds is inconsistent with equilibrium. However,
incomplete information about a player’s characteristics can be exploited to
support an equilibrium reputation for cooperating or ﬁghting entry (Kreps,
Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom
and Roberts (1982)). In inﬁnitely repeated games, the multiplicity of equilibria
provided by the folk theorem contrasts with the intuitive attraction of equi-
libria that provide relatively high payoffs. Reputation effects can again rescue
intuition by imposing lower bounds on equilibrium payoffs (Fudenberg and
Levine (1989, 1992)).
This paper explores long-run reputation effects in games of imperfect mon-
itoring with a long-lived player facing a sequence of short-lived players. In the
absence ofincompleteinformationaboutthelong-livedplayer,herequilibrium
payoff can be any value between her minmax payoff and an upper bound (in-
dependent of her discount factor) strictly smaller than her Stackelberg payoff.
However, when there is incomplete information about the long-lived player’s
type, reputation effects imply that the equilibrium payoff of a patient long-
lived player must be arbitrarily close to her Stackelberg payoff (Fudenberg and
Levine (1992)).
This powerful implication is a “short-run” reputation effect, concerning the
long-lived player’s expected average payoff calculated at the beginning of the
game. We show that this implication does not hold in the long run: A long-lived
player canmaintain apermanent reputation forplayinga commitmentstrategy
in a game with imperfect monitoring only if that strategy plays an equilibrium
of the corresponding complete-information stage game.
1We thank an editor, three referees, Drew Fudenberg, Ehud Kalai, and audiences at many
seminars for their helpful comments, and the National Science Foundation (Grants SES-0095768
and SES-9911219) for ﬁnancial support.
407408 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
More precisely, the long-lived player in the incomplete-information game
is either a commitment type, who plays an exogenously speciﬁed stage-game
action, or a normal type, who maximizes payoffs. The actions, and hence be-
liefs, of the uninformed short-lived players are public, so that the long-lived
player’s reputation is public. We show that if the commitment action is not an
equilibrium strategy for the normal type in the stage game, then in any Nash
equilibrium of the incomplete-information repeated game, almost surely the
short-lived players will learn the long-lived player’s type. Thus, a long-lived
player cannot indeﬁnitely maintain a reputation for behavior that is not credi-
b l eg i v e nt h ep l a y e r ’ st y p e .
The assumption that monitoring is imperfect is critical.2 It is straightforward
to construct equilibria under perfect monitoring that exhibit permanent rep-
utations. Any deviation from the commitment strategy reveals the type of the
deviator and triggers a switch to an undesirable equilibrium of the resulting
complete-information continuation game. In contrast, under imperfect moni-
toring, any deviation by the long-livedplayer neither reveals the deviator’s type
nortriggers a punishment.Instead, the long-runconvergence ofbeliefsensures
that eventually any current signal of play has an arbitrarily small effect on the
short-lived player’s beliefs. As a result, a long-lived player ultimately incurs
virtually no cost from a single small deviation from the commitment strategy.
But the long-run effect of many such small deviations from the commitment
strategy is to drive the equilibrium to full revelation. Reputations can thus be
maintained only in the absence of an incentive to indulge in such deviations,
that is, only if the reputation is for behavior that is part of an equilibrium of
the complete-information stage game.
The impermanence of reputation arises at the behavioral as well as at
the belief level. Asymptotically, continuation play is a Nash equilibrium of
the complete-information game. Moreover, while the explicit construction
of equilibria in reputation games is difﬁcult, we are able to provide a par-
tial converse (under a continuity hypothesis): for any strict Nash equilibrium
of the stage game and ε>0, there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game such that if the long-lived player is normal, then with prob-
ability at least 1 −ε, eventually the stage-game Nash equilibrium is played in
every period.3
While the short-run properties of equilibria are interesting, we believe that
the long-run equilibrium properties are relevant in many situations. For exam-
2Our results do apply to games of perfect monitoring in which the commitment type plays a
mixed strategy (see the discussion at the conclusion of Section 4.1).
3Since these results hold for any discount factor, there is an apparent tension with Fudenberg
and Levine (1992). However, the typical exercise in the reputation literature is to ﬁx the prior
probability of the commitment type, and then take the discount factor close to one. We instead
ﬁx both the prior and the discount factor (which may be close to one, given the prior), and exam-
ine long-run equilibrium behavior. The posterior probability of the commitment type eventually
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ple, an analyst may not know the age of the relationship to which the model
is to be applied. We do sometimes observe strategic interactions from a well-
deﬁned beginning, but we also often encounter on-going interactions whose
beginnings are difﬁcult to identify. Long-run equilibrium properties may be an
important guide to behavior in the latter cases. Alternatively, one might take
the view of a social planner who is concerned with the continuation payoffs of
the long-run player and with the fate of all short-run players, even those in the
distant future. Our analysis also suggests that the short-run players may have
d e ﬁ n i t ep r e f e r e n c e sa st ow h e r et h e ya p p e a ri nt h eq u e u eo fs h o r t - r u np l a y -
ers, offering a new perspective on the incentives created by repeated games.
Finally, interest often centers on the steady states of models with incomplete
information, again directing attention to long-run properties.
Weview ourresults assuggesting that amodelof long-run reputationsshould
incorporate some mechanism by which the uncertainty about types is continu-
ally replenished. Holmström (1999), Cole, Dow, and English (1995), Mailath
and Samuelson (2001), and Phelan (2001) assume that the type of the long-
lived player is governed by a stochastic process rather than being determined
once and for all at the beginning of the game. In such a situation, reputations
can indeed have long-run implications.
The next section uses a simple motivating example to place our contribution
in the literature. Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 presents the state-
ments of the theorems, with the main result proven in Section 5. For exposi-
tional clarity, most of the paper considers a long-lived player, who can be one
of two possible types—a commitment type who always plays the same (possibly
mixed) stage-game action and a normal type—facing a sequence of short-lived
players whose actions are perfectly observed. Section 6 establishes conditions
under which our results continue to hold when there are many possible com-
mitment types, when these commitment types play more complicated strate-
gies, when the uninformedplayer is long-lived,and when the short-run player’s
actions are not observed.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Consider an inﬁnitely-lived player 1 with discount factor δ playing a
simultaneous-move stage game with a succession of short-lived player 2’s who




T 2 3 0 2
B 3 0 1 1
(1)
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Player 1’s action in any period is not observed by any player 2. There is,
however, a public signal of player 1’s action, that takes on two possible values,
y  and y  , according to the distribution
Pr{y = y
  | i}=

p  if i = T,
q  if i = B,
where p>q.P l a y e r2’ sa c t i o n sa r ep u b l i c .P l a yer1’s payoffsare as inthe above
stage game (1), and player 2’s ex post payoffs (i.e., payoffs as a function of the
realized public signal and his own action) are given by
LR
y  3(1−q)/(p−q) (1−2q +p)/(p−q)
y   −3q/(p−q) (−2q +p)/(p−q)
.
Expectedpayoffsforplayer2are thusstillgivenby(1).Thisstructure ofexpost
payoffs ensures that the information content of the public signal is identical to
that of player 2’s payoffs.
This game is an example of what Fudenberg and Levine (1994) call a moral
hazard mixing game.E v e nf o rl a r g eδ, the long-run player’s maximum Nash
(or,equivalently, sequential) equilibriumpayoffislowerthan whenmonitoring
is perfect (Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Theorem 6.1, part (iii))).4 For our
example, it is straightforward to apply the methodology of Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990)to showthat if 2p>1+q,the set ofNash equilibriumpayoffs







Moreover, if 2δ(p − q) > 1, there is a continuum of particularly simple equi-
libria, with player 1 placing equal probability on T and on B in every period,
irrespective of history, and with player 2’s strategy having one period memory.
Player 2 plays L with probability α  after signal y  and with probability α   after
signal y  ,w i t h
2δ(p−q)(α
  −α
  ) = 1 
The maximum payoff of 2 −(1−p)/(p−q) is obtained by setting α  = 1.
We introduce incomplete information by assuming there is a probability
p0 > 0 that player 1 is the Stackelberg type who plays T inevery period.Fuden-
berg and Levine (1992) show that for any payoff u<2, there is δ sufﬁciently
4In other words, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) does not hold
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closeto 1 suchthat in every Nash equilibrium,theexpected average discounted
payoff to player 1 is at least u.W ee m p h a s i z et h a tu can exceed the upper
bound in (2), so that the normal player 2 does strictly better in every equilib-
rium of the incomplete-information game than the best complete-information
equilibrium.5
Our result is that the effect of the incomplete information about player 1,
including the lower bounds placed on payoffs illustrated in this example, is
temporary. To develop intuition, consider a Markov perfect equilibrium, with
player 2’s belief that player 1 is the Stackelberg type (i.e., player 1’s “repu-
tation”) being the natural state variable. In any such equilibrium, the normal
type cannot play T for sure in any period: if she did, the posterior after any
signal in that period is the prior, and hence continuation play is independent
of the signal. But then player 1 has no incentive to play T.T h u s ,i na n yp e -
riod of a Markov perfect equilibrium, player 1 must put positive probability
on B. Consequently, the signals are continually informative about player 1’s
type, and so almost surely, when player 1 is normal, beliefs converge to zero
probability on the Stackelberg type.6 Our analysis exploits this intuition, but
we do not restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria and we generalize the
result to more complicated commitment types.
While some of our arguments and results are reminiscent of the recent lit-
erature on rational learning and merging, there are important differences. For
example, Jordan (1991) studies the asymptotic behavior of “Bayesian strategy
processes,” in which myopic players play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the one-
shot game in each period, players initially do not know the payoffs of their op-
ponents,and playersobserve past play.The central result is that playconverges
to a Nash equilibrium of the complete-informationstage game. In contrast, the
player with private information in our game is long-lived and potentially very
patient, introducing intertemporal considerations that do not appear in Jor-
dan’s model, while the information processing in our model is complicated by
the imperfect monitoring.
A key idea in our results (in particular, Lemma 1) is that if signals are sta-
tistically informative about a player’s behavior, then nontrivial beliefs about
that player’s type can persist only if different types asymptotically play iden-
tically. Similar ideas play an important role in merging arguments (e.g., Sorin
(1999)), which provide conditions under which a stochastic process and beliefs
over that process converge. Kalai and Lehrer (1995) use merging to provide
a simple argument that in reputation games, asymptotic continuation play is a
subjective correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game. This re-
sult is immediate in our context, since we begin with a Nash equilibrium of the
5For any u<5/2, if the commitment type is a mixed commitment type, playing T with a prob-
ability less than but sufﬁciently close to 1/2, and δ is sufﬁciently close to one, then every Nash
equilibrium average discounted payoff for player 1 must be at least u.
6Benabou and Laroque (1992) study the Markov perfect equilibrium of a game with similar
properties.Theyshow thatplayer 1 eventuallyrevealshertypein anyMarkovperfectequilibrium.412 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
incomplete-information game (in contrast to the weaker assumptions of Kalai
and Lehrer (1995)).
Jackson and Kalai (1999) prove that if a ﬁnitely repeated normal-form game
with incomplete information (for which Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) prove a
reputation folk theorem) is itself repeated, with new players ine a c hr e p e t i t i o n ,
then eventually, reputations cannot affect play in the ﬁnitely repeated game.
While they reach a similar conclusion, the model is quite different. In partic-
ular, players in one round of the ﬁnitely repeated game do not internalize the
effects of their behavior on beliefs and so behavior of players in future rounds,
and there is perfect monitoring of actions in each stage game. We exploit the
imperfection of the monitoring to show that reputations are eventually dissi-
pated even when players recognize their long-run incentives to preserve these
reputations.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. The Complete-Information Game
The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move ﬁnite game of public
monitoring. Player 1 chooses an action i ∈{ 1 2     I}≡I and player 2 simul-
taneously chooses an action j ∈{ 1 2     J}≡J. The public signal, denoted y,
is drawn from a ﬁnite set, Y. The probability that y is realized under the ac-
tion proﬁle (i j) is given by ρ
y
ij. The ex post stage-game payoff to player 1
from the action proﬁle (i j) and signal y is given by f1(i j y).T h ee xa n t e
stage-game payoff for player 1 is then π1(i j) =

y f1(i j y)ρ
y
ij.T h ee xp o s t
stage-game payoffto player 2 from the action j and signal y is given by f2(j y),





The stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Player 1 (“she”) is a long-lived (equiv-
alently, long-run) player with discount factor δ<1. Her payoffs in the in-
ﬁnite horizon game are the average discounted sum of stage-game payoffs,
(1−δ)
∞
t=0δtπ1(it j t). The role of player 2 (“he”) is played by a sequence of
short-lived (or short-run) players, each of whom only plays once.
The actions of player 2 are public, while player 1’s actions are private.
Player 1 in period t has a private history, consisting of the public signals and
all past actions, denoted by h1t ≡ ((i0 j 0 y 0) (i1 j 1 y 1)     (i t−1 j t−1 y t−1)) ∈
H1t ≡ (I ×J ×Y) t.L e t{H1t}∞
t=0 denote the ﬁltration on (I ×J ×Y) ∞ induced
by the private histories of player 1. The public history,o b s e r v e db yb o t hp l a y e r s ,
is the sequence ((j0 y 0) (j1 y 1)     (j t−1 y t−1)) ∈ (J×Y) t.Le t{Ht}∞
t=0 denote
the ﬁltration induced by the public histories.
We assume the public signals have full support (Assumption 1), so every
signal y is possible after any action proﬁle. We also assume that with sufﬁcient
observations player 2 can correctly identify,fromthe frequencies ofthe signals,
any ﬁxed stage-game action of player 1 (Assumption 2).
ASSUMPTION 1 (Full Support): ρ
y
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ASSUMPTION 2( I d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o n ) :For all j ∈ J, the I columns in the matrix
(ρ
y
ij)y∈Y i∈I are linearly independent.
A behavior strategy for player 1 is a map σ1 :
∞
t=0H1t → ∆I,f r o mt h es e to f
private histories of lengths t = 0 1    to the set of distributions over current
actions. Similarly, a behavior strategy for player 2 is a map σ2 :
∞
t=0Ht → ∆J.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l eσ = (σ1 σ 2) induces a probability distribution Pσ over
(I ×J ×Y) ∞.L e tEσ[·|H t] denote player  ’s expectations with respect to this
distribution conditional on H t,w h e r eH2t =Ht.7
In equilibrium, the short-run player plays a best response after every equi-
librium history. Player 2’s strategy σ2 is a best response to σ1 if, for all t,
E
σ[π2(it j t) |Ht]≥E
σ[π2(it j)|Ht]  ∀j ∈ JP
σ-a.s.
Denote the set of such best responses by BR(σ1).
The deﬁnition of a Nash equilibrium is completed by the requirement that
player 1’s strategy maximizes her expected utility:
DEFINITION 1: A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game is a

























The assumption of full-support monitoring ensures that all ﬁnite sequences
of public signals occur with positive probability, and hence must be followedby
optimal behavior in any Nash equilibrium. The only public out-of-equilibrium
events are those in which player 2 deviates. Since player 2 is a short-run player,
he can never beneﬁt from such a choice. Consequently, any Nash equilibrium
outcome is also the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
3.2. The Incomplete-Information Game
At time t =− 1 a type of player 1 is selected. With probability 1−p0 > 0s h e
is the “normal” type, denoted by n, with the preferences described above. With
probability p0 > 0 she is a “commitment” type, denoted by c, who plays the
same (possibly mixed) action ς1 ∈ ∆I in each period independent of history.8
We make the following assumption.
7This expectation is well-deﬁned, since I, J,a n dY are ﬁnite.
8When we are interested in “Stackelberg” commitment types, and the attendant lower bounds
on player 1’s ex ante payoffs, it sufﬁces to consider commitment types who follow such simple
strategies when player 2 is a short-run type. More complicated commitment types are discussed
in Section 6.2.414 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
ASSUMPTION 3: Player 2 has a unique best reply to ς1 (denoted ς2) and ς ≡
(ς1 ς 2) is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Denote by ˆ σ1 the repeated-game strategy of playing ς1 ∈ ∆I in each period
independentofhistory. Since ς2 i st h eu n i q u eb e s tr e s p o n s et oς1, BR(ˆ σ1) is the
singleton {ˆ σ2},wher eˆ σ2 isthe strategy of playingς2 ineach periodindependent
of history. Since ς is not a stage game Nash equilibrium, (ˆ σ1  ˆ σ2) is not a Nash
equilibrium of the complete-information inﬁnite horizon game.
The example from Section 2 illustrates the role of the assumption that
player 2 has a unique best response. The strategy that places equal probability
on T and B ( w h i l en o tp a r to fa ne q u i l i b r i u mo ft h es t a g eg a m e )i sp a r to fm a n y
equilibria of the complete-informationgame (as longas δ>1/[2(p−q)]), and
consequently the normaltype can have a permanent reputation forplayinglike
that commitment type. On the other hand, player 2 has a unique best response
to anymixture inwhich player 1 randomizeswith probability ofT strictly larger
than
1
2, and a strategy that always plays such a mixture is not part of any equi-
librium of the complete-information game.
A state of the world is now a type for player 1 and sequence of actions
and signals. The set of states is Ω ={ n c}×(I × J × Y) ∞.T h ep r i o rp0,
commitment strategy ˆ σ1, and the strategy proﬁle of the normal players
˜ σ = (˜ σ1 σ 2) induce a probability measure P over Ω,w h i c hd e s c r i b e sh o wa n
uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strategy proﬁle ˆ σ = (ˆ σ1 σ 2)
(resp., ˜ σ = (˜ σ1 σ 2)) determines a probability measure 	 P (resp., 
 P)o v e rΩ,
which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the commitment (resp.,
normal) type. Since 
 P and 	 P are absolutely continuous with respect to P,
any statement that holds P-almost surely, also holds 
 P-a n d	 P-almost surely.
Henceforth, we will use E[·] to denote unconditional expectations taken with
respect to the measure P. 
 E[·] and 	 E[·] are used to denote conditional expec-
tations taken with respect to the measures 
 P and 	 P. Generic outcomes are
denoted by ω. The ﬁltrations {H1t}∞
t=0 and {Ht}∞
t=0 on (I × J × Y) ∞ can also
be viewed as ﬁltrations on Ω in the obvious way; we use the same notation for
these ﬁltrations (the relevant sample space will be obvious).
For any repeated-game behavior strategy σ1 :
∞
t=0H1t → ∆I,d e n o t eb yσ1t
the tth period behavior strategy, so that σ1 can be viewed as the sequence of
functions (σ10 σ 11 σ 12    )with σ1t : H1t → ∆I.W ee x t e n dσ1t from H1t to Ω
in the obvious way, so that σ1t(ω) ≡ σ1t(h1t(ω)),w h e r eh1t(ω) is player 1’s
t-period history under ω. A similar comment applies to σ2.
Given the strategy σ2, the normal type has the same objective function as
in the complete-information game. Player 2, on the other hand, is maximizing
E[π2(it j)| Ht],s ot h a ta f t e ra n yh i s t o r yht, he is updating his beliefs over the
type of player 1 that he is facing. The proﬁle (˜ σ1 σ 2) is a Nash equilibrium of
the incomplete-information game if each player is playing a best response.
At any equilibrium, player 2’s posterior belief in period t that player 1
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pt : Ω →[ 0 1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes’ rule determines this posterior after
all sequences of signals. Thus, in period t, player 2 is maximizing
ptπ2(ς1 j)+(1−pt)
 E[π2(it j)|Ht]
P-almost surely. At any Nash equilibrium of this game, the belief pt is a
bounded martingale with respect to the ﬁltration {Ht}t and measure P.9 It
therefore converges P-almost surely (and hence 
 P-a n d	 P-almost surely) to
a random variable p∞ deﬁned on Ω. Furthermore, at any equilibrium the pos-
terior pt is a 	 P-submartingale and a 
 P-supermartingale with respect to the
ﬁltration {Ht}t.
A ﬁnal word on notation: The expression 
 E[σ1t|Hs] is the standard condi-
tional expectation, viewed as an Hs-measurable random variable on Ω,w h i l e

 E[σ1(h1t)|hs] is the conditional expected value of σ1(h1t) (with h1t viewed as a
random history) conditional on the observation of the public history hs.
4. IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS
4.1. Asymptotic Beliefs
Our main result is Theorem 1:
THEOREM 1: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2, and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. In any Nash equi-
librium of the game with incomplete information, pt → 0 
 P-almost surely.
The intuition is straightforward: Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium of the
incomplete-information game in which both the normal and the commitment
type receive positive probability in the limit (on a positive probability set of
histories). On this set of histories, player 2 cannot distinguish between signals
generated by the two types (otherwise player 2 could ascertain which type he
is facing), and hence must believe that the normal and commitment types are
playing the same strategies on average. But then player 2 must play a best re-
sponse to the commitment type. Since the commitment type’s behavior is not a
best reply for the normal type (to this player-2 behavior), player 1 must even-
tually ﬁnd it optimal to not play the commitment-type strategy, contradicting
player 2’s beliefs. The proof is in Section 5.
As we noted in the Introduction, our argument makes critical use of the as-
sumption of full-support imperfect monitoring. However, if monitoring is per-
fect and the commitment type plays a mixed strategy, the game effectively has
imperfectmonitoring(as Fudenberg andLevine (1992)observe). Forexample,
in the perfect monitoring version of the game described in Section 2 (so that
9These properties are well-known. Proofs for the model with perfect monitoring (which carry
over to imperfect monitoring) can be found in Cripps and Thomas (1995).416 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
player 1’s action choice is public), if the commitment type randomizes with
probability 3/4o nT, then the realized action choice is a noisy signal of the
commitment type. Theorem 1 immediately applies to the perfect monitoring
case, as long as the commitment type plays a mixed strategy with full support.
4.2. Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
Given Theorem 1, we should expect continuation play to converge to a Nash
equilibrium of the complete-information game. Our next theorem conﬁrms
this result.
We use the term continuation game for the game with initial period in pe-
riod t, ignoring the period t histories. We use the notation t  = 0 1 2    for a
period of play in a continuation game (which may be the original game) and t
for the time elapsed prior to the start of the continuation game. A pure strat-
egy for player 1, s1,i sas e q u e n c eo fm a p ss1t  : H1t  → I for t  = 0 1    .T h u s ,
s1t  ∈ IH1t  and s1 ∈ I

t  H1t  ≡ S1,a n ds i m i l a r l ys2 ∈ S2 ≡ J

t  Ht .T h es p a c e sS1
and S2 are countable products of ﬁnite sets. We equip each space S ,   = 1 2,
with the σ-algebra generated by the cylinder sets, denoted by S .T h ep l a y e r s ’
payoffs in the inﬁnitely repeated game (as a function of pure strategies) are
given by












2(s1 s 2) ≡ E[π2(it  j t )] 
The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (it  j t ). These are ran-
dom, given the pure strategy proﬁle (s1 s 2),b e c a u s et h ep u r ea c t i o np l a y e di n
period t depends upon the random public signals.
For   = 1 2, let M  denote the space of probability measures µ  on (S  S ).
We say a sequence of measures µ
n
1 ∈ M1 converges to µ1 ∈ M1 if, for each
τ ≥ 0, we have
µ
n
1|I(I×J×Y)τ → µ1|I(I×J×Y)τ (3)
and a sequence of measures µ
n




2|J(J×Y)τ → µ2|J(J×Y)τ  (4)
Moreover, each M  is sequentially compact in the topology of this conver-
gence. Payoffs for players 1 and 2 are extended to M = M1 × M2 in the
obvious way. Since player 1’s payoffs are discounted, the inherited prod-
uct topology is strong enough to guarantee continuity of u1 : M → R.E a c h
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Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game. If the normal type
of player 1 observes a private history h1t ∈ H1t,h e rs t r a t e g y˜ σ1 speciﬁes a be-
havior strategy in the continuation game. This behavior strategy is realization
equivalent to a mixed strategy ˜ µ
h1t
1 ∈ M1 for the continuation game. For a
given public history, ht, there are many possible such mixed strategies that the
normal type could be playing. We let ˜ µ
ht
1 denote the expected value of ˜ µ
h1t
1 ,
conditional on the public history ht. From the point of view of player 2, who
observes only the public history, ˜ µ
ht
1 is the strategy of the normal player 1 fol-
lowing history ht.W el e tµ
ht
2 ∈ M2 denote player 2’s mixed strategy in the
continuation game.
If wehadmetrizedM, anaturalformalizationoftheideathatasymptotically
the normaltype andplayer 2 are playingaNash equilibriumis that the distance





to zero. While M is metrizable, a simpler and equivalent formulation is that




2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.10
Section A.1 proves Theorem 2.
THEOREM 2: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2,and thecommitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3.For any Nash equi-
librium of the incomplete-information game and for 
 P-almost all sequences of his-





is a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game with normal player 1.
Suppose the Stackelberg payoff is not a Nash equilibrium payoff of the
complete-informationgame. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine (1992)provide
a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs in the incomplete-information game of
the following type: Fix the prior probability of the Stackelberg (commitment)
type. Then, there is a value for the discount factor, ¯ δ,s u c ht h a ti fδ>¯ δ,t h e ni n
every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player’s ex ante payoff is essentially no
less than the Stackelberg payoff. The reconciliation of this result with Theo-
rem 2 lies in the order of quantiﬁers: while Fudenberg and Levine ﬁx the prior,
p0,a n dt h e ns e l e c t¯ δ(p0) large (with ¯ δ(p0) → 1a sp0 → 0), we ﬁx δ and exam-
ine asymptotic play, so that eventually pt is sufﬁciently small that ¯ δ(pt)>δ.
4.3. Asymptotic Restrictions on Behavior
This section provides a partial converse to Theorem 2. We identify a class of
equilibria of the complete-information game to which (under a continuity hy-
10This equivalence is an implication of the sequential compactness of M, since every subse-
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pothesis)equilibriumplayofthe incomplete-informationgamecanconverge.11
The proof is in Section A.2.
Recall that in the example of Section 2, the stage game has a (unique) strict
Nash equilibrium BR. It is a straightforward implication of Fudenberg and
Levine (1992) that the presence of the commitment type ensures that, as long
as player 1 is sufﬁciently patient, every equilibrium in this example begins with
a long sequence of play close to TL. On the other hand, an implication of
Theorem 3 below is that for the same parameters (in particular, the same prior
probability of the commitment type), there is an equilibrium in which, with
arbitrarily high probability under 
 P, BR is eventually played in every period.
T h ec o n s t r u c t i o no fs u c ha ne q u i l i b r i u mm u s ta d d r e s st h ef o l l o w i n gt w oi s -
sues. First, as we just observed, reputation effects may ensure that for a long
period of time, equilibrium play will be very different from BR.T h e o r e m3
is consistent with this, since it only claims that in the equilibrium of interest,
BR is eventually played in every period with high probability. Second, even if
reputation effects are not currently operative (because the current belief that
player 1 is the commitment type is low), with positive probability (albeit small),
a sequence of signals will arise that increases the posterior that player 1 is the
commitment type and hence makes reputation effects a recurring possibility.
THEOREM 3: Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions
1 and 2, and the commitment action ς1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. Suppose the stage
game has a strict Nash equilibrium, (i∗ j∗). Suppose that for all ε>0, there ex-
ists η and an equilibrium of the complete-information game, σ(0), such that for
all p0 ∈ (0 η), the game with incomplete-information with prior p0 h a sa ne q u i -
librium whose payoff to player 1 is within ε of u1(σ(0)). Given any prior p0 and
any δ, for all ε>0, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information
game in which the 
 P-probability of the event that eventually (i∗ j∗) is played in
every period is at least 1−ε.
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
5.1. Player 2’s Posterior Beliefs
The ﬁrst step is to show that either player 2’s expectation (given the public
history) of the strategy played by the normal type is in the limit identical to
the strategy played by the commitment type, or player 2’s posterior probability
that player 1 is the commitment type converges to zero (given that player 1 is
indeed normal).
This is an extension of a familiar merging-style argument to the case of im-
perfect monitoring. If the distributions generating player 2’s observations are
different for the normal and commitment types, then he will be updating his
11We conjecture this hypothesis is redundant, given the other conditions of the theorem, but
have not been able to prove it.IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 419
posterior, continuing to do so as the posterior approaches zero. His poste-
rior converges to something strictly positive only if the distributions generating
these observations are in the limit identical. In the statement of the following
Lemma, h1t is to be interpreted as a function from Ω to (I ×Y) t.




 ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1t |Ht]
  = 0 P -a.s. (5)
PROOF:L e t pt+1(ht;jt y t) denote player 2’s belief in period t +1a f t e rp l a y -
ing jt in period t, observing the signal yt in period t, and given the history ht.
By Bayes’ rule,
pt+1(ht;jt y t) =
pt Pr[yt | ht j t c]
pt Pr[yt | ht j t c]+(1−pt)Pr[yt | ht j t n]
 












ijt|ht].U s i n gt h e
linearity of the expectations operator, we write pt+1(ht;jt y t) as






































Denote the summation on the left by A and note that A<maxiρ
yt
ijt < 1. Re-
peating the derivation of (6) for 1 − pt+1, the probability that player 1 is nor-






1(h1t)|ht]. Taking the difference
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Sincept isa P-almostsure convergentsequence,it isCauchyP-almostsurely.13


















  → 0 P -a.s. (8)
Hence, if both types are given positive probability in the limit, then the fre-
quency that any signal is observed is identical under the two types.
We now show that (8) implies (5). Let Πjt be a |Y|×| I| matrix whose yth
row, for each signal y ∈ Y, contains the terms ρ
y
ijt for i = 1     |I|.T h e na s( 8 )






  → 0 P -a.s.  (9)
where     is the supremum norm. By Assumption 2, the matrices Πjt have
I linearly independent columns for all jt,s ox = 0 is the unique solution
to Πjtx = 0i nRI. In addition, there exists a strictly positive constant b =









 ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1t|Ht]
  → 0 P -a.s. 
which implies (5). Q.E.D.
Condition (5) says that either player 2’s best prediction of the normal type’s
behavior is eventually identical to the commitment type’s behavior (that is,
 ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1t | Ht]  → 0 P-almost surely), or the type is revealed (that is,
p∞(1−p∞) = 0 P-almost surely). However, p∞ < 1 
 P-almost surely, and
hence (5) implies a simple corollary:14
COROLLARY 1: At any equilibrium of a game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2,
lim
t→∞pt
 ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1t |Ht]
  = 0  
 P-a.s.
5.2. Beliefs about Player 2’s Beliefs
Corollary 1 implies that if pt  → 0 on a set of states with positive measure,
then (on this set of states) player 2 must think that the normal type’s strategy
13Note that the analysis is now global, rather than local, in that we treat all the expressions as
functions on Ω.
14Since the odds ratio pt/(1 − pt) is a 
 P-martingale, p0/(1 − p0) = 
 E[pt/(1 − pt)] for all t.
The left side of this equality is ﬁnite, so limpt <1 
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is arbitrarily close to that of the commitment type. Since player 1 is better
informed than player 2, player 1 must know that player 2 believes this:
LEMMA 2: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. Suppose there exists
A ⊂ Ω such that 
 P(A)>0 and p∞(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ A. Then, for sufﬁciently
small η>0,there exists F ⊂ A with 
 P(F)>0 such that, for any ξ>0,there exists
T for which











<ξ   ∀t>T (11)











→ 1  (12)
where the convergence is uniform on F.
PROOF: Deﬁne theevent Dη ={ ω ∈ A : p∞(ω) > 2η}.Becausethe set A on
which p∞(ω) > 0h a s
 P-positive measure, for any η>0 sufﬁciently small, we
have 
 P(Dη)>2µ,f o rs o m eµ>0. On the set of states Dη the random variable
 ς1−
 E[˜ σ1t|Ht]  tends 
 P-almostsurelyto zero(by Lemma1).Therefore,onDη
the random variable Zt = sups≥t  ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1s|Hs]  converges 
 P-almost surely to
zero and so on Dη (by a simple extension of Hart (1985, Lemma 4.24))

 E[Zt |Ht]→0 
 P-almost surely  (13)
Egorov’s Theorem (Chung (1974, p. 4)) then implies that there exists F ⊂ Dη
such that 
 P(F)≥ µ on which the convergence of pt and 
 E[Zt|Ht] is uniform.
Hence, for any ξ>0, there exists a time T such that the inequalities in (10)
and (11) hold everywhere on F for all t>T.















→ 1  Q.E.D.
5.3. Completion of the Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that, on a subset of the
states F in Lemma 2, player 2 believes he should be playing a best response
to the commitment strategy. The normal type of player 1 will best respond to422 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
this player-2 best response with high probability, ensuring that the normal and
commitment types of player 1 play differently, contradicting the assumption
that pt  → 0o nF.
Deﬁne β ≡ mini{ςi
1 : ςi
1 > 0} and γ ≡ miny i jρ
y
ij, where the latter is strictly
positive by Assumption 1. Since ς1 is not a best reply for the normal type to
ς2 (the myopic best reply to ς1), there exists η>0 such that for any repeated-
game strategy for player 2 that attaches probability at least 1−η to ˆ σ2 (i.e., to
always playing ς2), ς1 is suboptimal for the normal type in period 1.
As ς2 i st h eu n i q u eb e s tr e s p o n s et oς1, it is strict and so there exists ψ>0
such that ς2 is the unique best response to any action of player 1, ς 
1, satisfying
 ς 
1 −ς1  <ψ.
Suppose that there is a positive 
 P-probability set of outcomes A on which
p∞ > 0. Choose ξ ζ such that ζ<β γand ξ<min{ψ β − ζγ}. By (12), there
is a 











> 1−ηζ  (14)
Hence, on F,
 ς1 − 
 E[˜ σ1t|Ht]
















and κt ≡ 















 E[gt | gt ≤ 1−η Ht](1−κt)+ 
 E[gt | gt > 1−η Ht]κt
≤ (1−η)(1−κt)+κt 
Combining the inequalities (14) and (16) we get that for almost every state

















> 1−ζ  (17)
and so player 2 assigns a probability of at least 1 −ζ to player 1 believing with
probability at least 1−η that player 2 believes player 1’s strategy is within ξ of
the commitment strategy.IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 423
Since ξ<ψ ,p l a y e r2p l a y sς2, the unique best response to the commitment
action, whenever he believes that 1’s strategy is within ξ of the commitment
strategy. Hence, in any period t>T, player 2 assigns a probability of at least
1 − ζ to player 1 believing that player 2’s subsequent play is ˆ σ2 with at least
probability 1− η. Thus, player 2 assigns probability at least 1 −ζ to player 1’s
subsequent play being a best response to player 2’s best response to ˆ σ1.B u t
η was chosen so that there is then an action in the support of ˆ σ1,s a yi ,t h a t
is not optimal in period t. Player 2 must accordingly believe that i  is played
with a probability of no more than ζ in period t.B u ts i n c eβ − ζ>ξ ,t h i s
contradicts (15). Q.E.D.
6. EXTENSIONS
6.1. Many Commitment Types
To extend the preceding analysis to the case in which there are many com-
mitment types, let T be a set of possible commitment types. The commitment
type c plays the repeated-game strategy ˆ σ
c
1 that plays the ﬁxed stage-game
action ς
c
1 ∈ ∆I in each period. We assume T is either ﬁnite or countably in-
ﬁnite, and ς
c
1  = ς
c 
1 for all c  = c  ∈ T .A tt i m et =− 1 a type of player 1 is se-
lected. With probability pc
0 > 0, she is commitment type c, and with probability
p
n




0 > 0 she is the “normal” type. A state of the world is, as be-
fore, a type for player 1 and sequence of actions and signals. The set of states
is then Ω = T × (I × J × Y) ∞.W ed e n o t eb y	 Pc the probability measure in-
duced on Ω by the commitment type c ∈ T , and as usual, we denote by 
 P the
probability measure on Ω induced by the normal type. Finally, we denote by pc
t
player 2’s period t belief that player 1 is the commitment type c.
To deal with many types of player 1, we ﬁrst argue that it is impossible for
two different commitment types to be given positive probability in the limit.
LEMMA 3: At any Nash equilibrium of a game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2,





t → 0 P-a.s.
PROOF: Derive (6) for each of the types c and c . Take the difference of
these two equations, repeat the remaining part of the proof of Lemma 1, and
use ςc
1  = ςc 
1 . Q.E.D.
THEOREM 4: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Let T ∗ be the set of







2) not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Then in any Nash equilib-
rium, pc
t → 0 for all c ∈T ∗ 
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The proofduplicates that of Theorem 1, with the followingchange. Fix some
type c  ∈ T ∗. In the proof, reinterpret 
 P as P−c  =

c =c  p
c
0	 Pc + p
n
0
 P,t h eu n -
conditional measure on Ω implied by the normal type and all the commitment
types other than c . The only point at which it is important that 
 P is indeed the
measure induced by the normal type is at the end of the proof, when the nor-
mal type has a proﬁtable deviation that contradicts player 2’s beliefs. We now
apply Lemma 3. Since we are arguing on a 
 P-positive probability subset where
pc 
t is not converging to zero, every other commitment type is receiving little
weight in 2’s beliefs. Consequently, from player 2’s point of view, eventually
the measures P−c  and 
 P are sufﬁciently close to obtain the same contradic-
tion.
6.2. Complicated Commitment Types
We have followed the common practice of considering simple commitment
types who repeat a ﬁxed stage-game mixture in each period. The results ex-
tend to commitment types whose strategies are not stationary, as long as their
behavior is eventually incompatible with equilibrium.
DEFINITION2: The strategy ¯ σ1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run,
if there exists   T and ε>0s u c ht h a t ,f o re v e r y¯ σ2 ∈ BR(¯ σ1) and for every t ≥   T,
there exists σ  

























As t r a t e g y¯ σ1 is simple if it plays the same stage-game (possibly mixed) ac-
tion after every history. A strategy ¯ σ1 is public if it is measurable with respect
to {Ht}t, so that the mixture over actions in each period depends only upon the
public history. A strategy ¯ σ1 is publicly implementable by a ﬁnite automaton if
t h e r ee x i s t saﬁ n i t es e tW ,a na c t i o nf u n c t i o nd : W → ∆I, a transition function
ϕ : W × Y → W , and an initial element w0 ∈ W ,s u c ht h a tσ1(ht) = d(w(ht)),
where w(ht) is the state reached from w0 under the public history ht and tran-
sition rule ϕ.
It is straightforward to show that if a simple strategy plays the stage-game
mixture ς ∈ ∆I, to which player 2 has a unique best response, then the strat-
egy is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run if and only if ς is not
part of a stage-game Nash equilibrium. Similarly, suppose ¯ σ1 is publicly imple-
mentable by the ﬁnite automaton (W d ϕ w 0),w i t he v e r ys t a t ei nW reach-
able from every other state in W under ϕ. If player 2 has a unique best replyIMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 425
to d(w) for all w ∈ W ,t h e n¯ σ1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run
if and only if ¯ σ1 is not part of a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information
game.15
THEOREM 5: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose ˆ σ1 is a public
strategy with ﬁnite range (i.e.,

ht ˆ σ1(ht) is ﬁnite) that is never an equilibrium
strategy in the long run. In any Nash equilibrium of any game with incomplete
information, pt → 0 
 P-almost surely.
PROOF:S i n c eˆ σ1 is never an equilibriumstrategy in the longrun,there exists
T such that after any positive probability history of length at least T, ˆ σ1 is not
a best response to any strategy σ2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1) of player 2 that best responds to
ˆ σ1. Indeed, there exists η>0 such that this remains true for any strategy of
player 2 that attaches probability at least 1−η to any strategy in BR(ˆ σ1).
The argument in Section 5.3 now applies, with the following three changes:
First, redeﬁne β as β ≡ mini ht{ˆ σi
1(ht) :ˆ σi
1(ht)>0} (which is strictly positive,
since ˆ σ1 has ﬁnite range). Second, T must be larger than T.T h i r d ,t h el a s tt w o
paragraphs of that section are replaced by the following:
Wenowarguethatthere isaperiodt ≥ T andanoutcomeinF suchthat ˆ σ1 is
not optimal for the normal player 1 in period t.G i v e na n yo u t c o m eω ∈ F and
ap e r i o dt ≥ T,l e tht be its t-period public history. There is a K>0s u c ht h a t
for any t large, there is a public history yt     y t+k,0≤ k ≤ K,u n d e rw h i c h
ˆ σ1(ht y t     y t+k) puts positive probability on a suboptimal action. (Other-
wise, no deviation can increase the period-t expected continuation payoff by at
least ε.) Moreover, by full support, any K sequence ofsignals has probability at
least λ>0. If the public history (ht y t     y t+k) is consistent with an outcome
in F, then we are done. So,suppose there is no such outcome.That is, forevery
t ≥ T, there is no outcome in F for which ˆ σ1 attaches positive probability to a
suboptimal action within the next K periods. Letting Ct(F) denotethe t-period
cylinder set of F, 
 P(F)≤ 
 P(Ct+K(F)) ≤ (1−λ)
 P(Ct(F)) (since the public his-
tory of signals that leads to a suboptimal action has probability at least λ). Pro-
ceedingrecursively fromT,wehave
 P(F)≤ 
 P(CT+ K(F)) ≤ (1−λ) 
 P(CT(F)),
and letting   →∞,w eh a v e
 P(F)= 0, a contradiction.
Hence, there is a period t ≥ T and an outcome in F such that one of the
actions in the support of ˆ σ1, i  say, is not optimal in period t.T h a ti s ,a n y
best response assigns zero probability to i  in period t. From (17), player 2’s
15The only if direction of this statement is obvious. So, suppose ¯ σ1 is not a Nash equilibrium
of the complete-information game. Since player 2 always has a unique best reply to d(w), σ2 is
public, and can also be represented as a ﬁnite-state automaton, with the same set of states and
transition function as ¯ σ1.S i n c e¯ σ1 is not a Nash equilibrium, there is some state w  ∈ W ,a n d
some action i  not in the support of d(w ) such that when the state is w ,p l a y i n gi  and then
following ¯ σ1 yields a payoff that is strictly higher than following ¯ σ1 at w . Since the probability of
reaching w  from any other state is strictly positive (and so bounded away from zero), ¯ σ1 is never
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beliefs give a probability of at least 1 − ζ to a strategy of player 1 that best
responds to 2’s best response to ˆ σ1, which means that player 2 believes that
i  is played with a probability of no more than ζ.B u ts i n c eβ − ζ>ξ ,t h i s
contradicts (15). Q.E.D.
6.3. Two Long-Lived Players
We now extend the analysis to the case of a long-lived player 2. The second
and third paragraphs of Section 5.3 are the only places where the assump-
tion that player 2 is short-lived makes an appearance. When player 2 is short-
lived, player 2 is myopically best responding to the current play of player 1,
a n ds oa sl o n ga sp l a y e r2i ss u f ﬁ c i e n t l yc o n ﬁ d e n tt h a th ei sf a c i n gt h ec o m m i t -
ment type, he will best respond to the commitment type. On the other hand,
if player 2 is long-lived, like player 1, then there is no guarantee that this is
still true. For example, player 2 may ﬁnd experimentation proﬁtable. Nonethe-
less, reputation effects can still be present (Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and
Pesendorfer (1996)).
The followingresult (proven in the Appendix)shows that if the commitment
type and the normal type are behaving sufﬁciently similarly, then player 2 will
beplayingabest responseto thecommitmenttypeforarbitrarily manyperiods.
(The notation (W d ϕ w 0) is described above Theorem 5.)
LEMMA 4: Suppose ˆ σ1 is publicly implementable by the ﬁnite automaton
(W d ϕ w 0), and BR(ˆ σ1;w ) is the set of best replies for player 2 to (W d 
ϕ w ). For any history ht, let w(ht) ∈ W be the state reached from w0 under the
public history consistent with ht. Let (˜ σ1 σ 2) be Nash equilibrium strategies in
the incomplete-information game where player 2 is long-lived with discount factor
















> 1−ψ  (18)
then for some σ 
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w(ht)), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the history
ht agrees with σ 
2 for the next T periods.
If player 2’s posterior that player 1 is the commitment type fails to converge
to zero on a set of states of positive 
 P-measure, then the same argument as in
Lemma 2 shows that (18) holds (note that (11) in Lemma 2 uses 
 P rather than
P to evaluate the probability of the event of interest).
With this result in hand, the proof of Theorem 1 goes through as before,
establishing Theorem 6:IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 427
THEOREM 6: Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Suppose ˆ σ1 is pub-
licly implementable by a ﬁnite automaton and is never an equilibrium strategy
in the long run. Let (˜ σ1 σ 2) be Nash equilibrium strategies in the incomplete-
information game where player 2 is long-lived with discount factor δ2 ∈[ 0 1).








Our results continue to hold when player 2’s actions are private, as long as
p l a y e r1c a ni n f e rp l a y e r2 ’ sp o s t e r i o rb e l i e fpt from the public signals.16 This










for all y ∈ Y, i i  ∈ I,a n dj j  ∈ J.T h i sh o l d s ,f o re x a m p l e ,i ft h ep u b l i cs i g n a l
y is a vector (y1 y 2) ∈ Y1 × Y2 = Y,w i t hy1 a signal of player 1’s action and
y2 an independent signal of player 2’s action. In this case, action i induces a







j ∀i j y  (19)
The full-support Assumption 1 is replaced by the requirement that, for all i
and y1 ∈ Y1,
ρ
y1
i > 0 
Assumption 2, in the presence of (19), is equivalent to the requirement that
there are I linearly independent columns in the matrix
(ρ
y1
i )y1∈Y1 i∈I 
Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2003) addresses the case where player 2’s
actions are not known to player 1 and his posterior depends upon his actions
as well as the public signals. In this case, the long-lived player’s reputation
is private, since the public signals do not allow player 1 to infer 2’s posterior
beliefs. This complicates the analysis, since it is now harder to show that the
convergenceofplayer2’sbeliefs impliesthatthenormalplayer1knowsshehas
a proﬁtable deviation from the commitment strategy. In the course of coping
with the potentialuninformativenessofthe publicsignals, weextend theresults
to the case of purely private monitoring.
16Indeed, each player 2’s action choices can be completely private, so that future player 2’s do
not learn the choice of the active player 2.428 M. CRIPPS, G. MAILATH, AND L. SAMUELSON
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APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2
PROOF: At the given equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal way from time t













1 s 2)] 
The subscripts on the expectation operator are the measures on (s1 s 2).M o r e o v e r ,f o rt h ed e -











1 s 2)]  (A.1)
Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards given the public information, which implies
that for all s 
2 ∈ S2,a l lht  and all t  > 0,
E(pt ˆ µ
ht






2(s1 s 2)]≥Ept ˆ µ
ht










1 is the play of the commitment type. Since player 2 is a short-run player, this inequality
is undiscounted and holds for all t .
From Theorem 1, pt → 0 
 P-almost surely. Suppose {ht}t is a sequence of public histories





t=1 → (˜ µ∗
1 µ ∗
2) on this sequence. We need to show that
(˜ µ∗
1 µ ∗
2) satisﬁes (A.1) and (A.2) (the latter for all t  > 0). It sufﬁces that the expectations
E(µ1 µ2)[u1(s1 s 2)] and E(µ1 µ2)[u2(s1 s 2)] are continuous in (µ1 µ 2). The continuity required is
established in the proof of Theorem 4.4 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
We begin by focusing on games that are “close” to the complete-information game. All the
lemmas assume the hypotheses of Theorem 3.
LEMMA A: For all T, there exists ˆ η>0 such that for all p0 ∈ (0  ˆ η), there is a Nash equilibrium
of the incomplete-information game in which the normal type plays i∗ and player 2 plays j∗ for the
ﬁrst T periods, irrespective of history.
PROOF:L e tε  =
1
2[π1(i∗ j∗) − maxi =i∗ π1(i j∗)] > 0. By assumption, there exists η>0
and a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game, σ(0), such that for each belief
p ∈[ 0 η), there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, σ(p), satisfying
|Epu1(σ(p)) −E0u1(σ(0))| <ε  /2, where Ep denotes taking expectations with probability p on
the commitment type. Hence, for p p  <η, |Epu1(σ(p)) −Ep u1(σ(p ))| <ε  .IMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 429
Since j∗ is player 2’s strict best response to i∗,t h e r ee x i s t sη  > 0s ot h a tf o ra l lpt <η  , j∗ is
still a best response to the normal type playing i∗.F o ra n yT there exists ˆ η>0s ot h a ti fp0 < ˆ η,
then pt < min{η η } in all periods t ≤ T, by Assumption 1. The equilibrium strategy proﬁle is
to play (i∗ j∗) for the ﬁrst T periods (ignoring history), and then play according to the strategy
proﬁle identiﬁed in the previous paragraph for the belief pT, σ(pT). By construction, no player
has an incentive to deviate and so the proﬁle is indeed a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
While, for T large, the equilibrium just constructed yields payoffs to player 1 that are close to
π1(i∗ j∗), the equilibrium guarantees nothing about asymptotic play. The equilibrium of the next
Lemma does.
LEMMA B: For all ε>0, there exists η∗ > 0 such that for all p0 ∈ (0 η ∗], there is a Nash
equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, σ∗∗(p0), in which the 
 P-probability of the event
that (i∗ j∗) is played in every period is at least 1−ε.
PROOF:F i xζ =
1
3[π1(i∗ j∗) − maxi =i∗ π1(i j∗)] > 0, and choose T large enough so that
δTM<ζ / 2 (recall that M is an upper bound for stage game payoffs) and that the average dis-
counted payoff to player 1 from T periods of (i∗ j∗) is within ζ/2o fπ1(i∗ j∗).D e n o t eb y ˆ η the
upper bound on beliefs given in Lemma A. For any prior p ∈ (0  ˆ η) that player 1 is the commit-
ment type, let σ∗(p) denote the equilibrium of Lemma A. By construction, σ∗(p) yields player 1
an expected payoff within ζ of π1(i∗ j∗).
There exists η   < ˆ η such that if pt <η   , then the posterior after T periods, pt+T(pt), is neces-
sarily below ˆ η. Consider thefollowing strategy proﬁle, consisting of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase,
play (i∗ j∗) for T periods, ignoring history. In the second phase, behavior depends on the pos-
terior beliefs of player 2, pt+T(pt).I fpt+T(pt)>η   ,p l a yσ∗(pt+T(pt)).I fpt+T(pt) ≤ η  ,b e g i n
the ﬁrst phase again.
By construction, the continuation payoffs at the end of the ﬁrst phase are all within ζ of
π1(i∗ j∗), and so for any prior satisfying p0 <η   , the strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium.
Fix p0,a n dl e tp
†
t be the beliefs of player 2 under the strategy proﬁle in which (i∗ j∗) is
played in every period, irrespective of history. It is immediate that p
†
t → 0 P†-almost surely
(where P† is the measure implied by (i∗ j∗) in every period), and so supt ≥t p
†
t  → 0 P†-almost
surely. Moreover, if p†
τ ≤ η   for all τ ≤ t,t h e np†
τ = pτ for all τ ≤ t.B yE g o r o v ’ sT h e o r e m ,
there exists a t∗ such that P†{supt ≥t∗ p
†
t  ≤ η  } > 1 − ε. But then for some public history, ht∗,
P†{supt ≥t∗ p
†
t  ≤ η  |ht∗} > 1−ε. The monotonicity of p
†
t as a function of p0 implies that, for
some η∗ > 0, if p0 <η ∗, p
†
t ≤ η   for all t ≤ t∗. Moreover, the set {supt ≥t∗ p
†
t  ≤ η  } cannot
shrink as p0 is reduced, and so P†{supt p
†
t ≤ η  } > 1 − ε.H e n c e ,f o rp0 <η ∗, 
 P{supt pt ≤ η  }=
P†{supt p
†
t ≤ η  } >1−ε. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: Weﬁrst construct an equilibrium of an artiﬁcial game, and then argue
that this equilibrium induces an equilibrium with the desired properties in the original game.
Fix ε and the corresponding η∗ from Lemma B. In the artiﬁcial game, player 2 has the action
space J ×{g e}×[0 1], where we interpret g as “go,” e as “end,” and p ∈[ 0 1] as an announce-
ment of the posterior belief of player 2. The game is over immediately when player 2 chooses e.
The payoffs for player 2 when player 2 ends the game with the announcementof p depend on the










2(i j e p;c)= π2(i j)−(1−η
∗)−(1−p)
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where η∗ > 0 is from Lemma B. The payoffs for player 2 while the game continues are
π
∗





2(i j e p;c)=π2(i j)−(1 −p)
2 
The payoffs for the normal type of player 1 from the outcome {(is j s g p s)}∞
s=0 (note that






sπ1(is j s) 
For the outcome {(is j s g)
t−1








where u1(σ∗∗(pt)) is player 1’s equilibrium payoff under σ∗∗(pt) from Lemma B.
Since player 2 chooses an announcement p ∈[ 0 1] to minimize (1−pt)p2 +pt(1−p)2,h ea l -
ways ﬁnds it strictly optimal to announce his posterior. Moreover, again by construction, player 2
ends the game if and only if his posterior is less than η∗. Moreover, the artiﬁcial game has an
equilibrium (σ∗
1 σ∗
2) (by Fudenberg and Levine (1983, Theorem 6.1)).
The desired equilibrium in the original game is given by (σ∗
1 σ∗
2), with the modiﬁcation that
should (σ∗
1 σ∗
2) call for player 2 to announce e, then play proceeds according to the equilibrium
speciﬁed in Lemma B for the corresponding value of ρ (<η ∗). It follows from Lemma B that this
is an equilibrium of the original game. It then follows from Theorem 1 that 
 P-almost surely, the
probability of the event that (i∗ j∗) is played eventually is at least 1−ε. Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4
PROOF:F i x T>0. Since W is ﬁnite, it is enough to argue that for each w ∈ W ,t h e r ei sψw > 0














then for some σ 
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the history ht agrees with σ 
2
for the next T periods.
Fix a public history, h 
t.L e tˆ σ1(hs) denote the play of the ﬁnite automaton (W d ϕ w(h  
t))
after the public history hs,w h e r eh 
t is the initial segment of hs. Since player 2 is discounting,
there exists T   such for any w ∈ W ,t h e r ei sεw > 0s u c ht h a ti ff o rs =t     t+T   and for all h2s
with initial segment h 
t,
 ˆ σ1(hs)− 
 E[˜ σ1s|hs]
  <ε w  (A.4)
then for some σ 
2 ∈ BR(ˆ σ1;w(h 
t)), the continuation strategy of σ2 after the history h 
t agrees with
σ 
2 for the next T periods.
By assumption, ∃κ>0s u c ht h a ti fσ
j
2(ht)>0t h e nσ
j





2 min{εw (κγ) T }. Suppose (A.3) holds with this ψw.W ec l a i mt h a t( A . 4 )h o l d sf o r
s = t     t+T   and for all hs with initial segment h 
t. Supposenot. The assumption on σ2 impliesIMPERMANENT REPUTATIONS 431
that the probability of the continuation history hs, conditional on the history h 






 	 E[ˆ σ1s|Hs]−
 E[˜ σ1s|Hs]






contradicting (A.3), since (κγ)T  >ψ w. Q.E.D.
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